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The Dilemma of the EU’s Future Trade 
Relations with Western Sahara  
Caught between strategic interests 
and international law?  
Guillaume Van der Loo 
Following the Court of Justice’s Polisario rulings, the EU is facing thorny legal and political 
challenges to include Western Sahara in its trade agreements with Morocco. 
n 27 February 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a new 
judgement in Case C-266/16 Western Sahara Campaign UK concerning the territorial 
application of an EU-Morocco agreement to Western Sahara, giving rise once again to 
diplomatic tensions between the EU and Rabat. The Court concluded that neither the Fisheries 
Agreement (2006) nor the associated Protocol (2013) are applicable to the waters adjacent to 
the territory of Western Sahara. The Court closely followed the analysis it had made in C-104/16 
Council v. Front Polisario, in which it held that the EU-Morocco Association Agreement (AA) and 
the 2012 agreement liberalising (processed) agricultural and fishery products (the 
“Liberalisation Agreement”) do not apply to Western Sahara. Whereas the Court clarifies the 
role of international law in the EU’s external policies in these fascinating cases, it leaves the 
European Commission in a very difficult situation, both legally and politically, to deal with the 
policy-consequences of these judgments.  
Western Sahara is recognised as a non-self-governing territory in accordance with Article 73 of 
the UN Charter, and the right to self-determination for such territories, Western Sahara in 
particular, has been stressed several times by different UN Resolutions and the International 
Court of Justice (e.g. its Advisory Opinion of 1975 on Western Sahara). The largest part of 
Western Sahara is still controlled by Morocco, which considers this territory to be an integral 
part of its sovereign territory, while the Front Polisario (the liberalisation movement seeking 
independence of Western Sahara) controls the remainder. Although the EU and its member 
states have never recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, the EU has de facto 
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been applying the EU-Morocco Liberalisation Agreement and Fisheries Agreement to (the 
waters adjacent to) Western Sahara, as confirmed by both the Council and the Commission.   
The EU-Morocco Association Agreement and the Liberalisation Agreement 
In Council v. Front Polisario, the Court set aside in appeal the judgement of the General Court 
(Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v. Council), which argued that the AA and the Liberalisation 
Agreement apply to the territory of Western Sahara. The CJEU found the opposite to be the 
case, concluding that in view of the “separate and distinct status” guaranteed to the territory 
of Western Sahara under international law (e.g. the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principle of self-determination), it cannot be held that the term “territory of the Kingdom of 
Morocco”, which defines the territorial scope of the AA and the Liberalisation Agreement, 
encompasses Western Sahara and, therefore, that those agreements are applicable to that 
territory. Moreover, the CJEU recalled the principle of the relative effect of treaties under which 
a treaty must neither impose any obligations nor confer any rights on third States without their 
consent (i.e. the pacta tertiis principle codified in Article 34 Vienna Convention of the Law of 
the Treaties). The Court previously relied on this principle in its famous Brita case when arguing 
that products originating in the occupied Palestinian territories do not fall within the territorial 
scope of the EU-Israel AA. In Council v. Front Polisario, the CJEU argued that the people of 
Western Sahara must be regarded as a ‘third party’ within the meaning of this international law 
principle and, because the people of Western Sahara did not express any such consent, that 
the AA and the Liberalisation agreement cannot be interpreted as including Western Sahara. 
This ruling upset the Moroccan government because it undermines its long-standing territorial 
claim over Western Sahara. The EU High Representative and the Moroccan Minister of Foreign 
Affairs adopted a joint statement which “took note” of the Court’s judgment and declared that 
they would “work together on any issue relating to its application in the spirit of the EU-
Morocco privileged partnership”.1 Remarkably, despite this judgement, the EU is eager to 
extend the application of these agreements to Western Sahara and to continue to grant 
products from Western Sahara preferential treatment on the same terms of products covered 
by the Liberalisation Agreement. In order to comply with the Court’s ruling, the Council 
authorised the Commission on 12 May 2017 to negotiate an agreement “on the adaptations of 
protocols to the EU-Morocco Association Agreement”.2 The negotiations were finalised on 31 
January 2018, and the text of the agreement has been initialled (but has not yet been made 
public).  
This agreement basically provides that products originating in Western Sahara will continue to 
benefit from preferential treatment in the same way as products covered by the Liberalisation 
Agreement. However, the Council’s negotiation mandate stresses that the agreement must 
comply with the outcome of the Court’s judgement, benefit the people of Western Sahara and 
                                                        
1 Déclaration conjointe par Federica Mogherini et le Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la coopération du 
royaume du Maroc Salahddine Mezouar, 21 December 2016. 
2 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on the adaptation of protocols 
to the Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco (ST 9093 2017 INIT 12) May 2017 
(document not accessible). 
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support the United Nations process on Western Sahara. In view of these requirements, the 
Commission is also finalising two reports that will accompany the Commission’s proposal for a 
Council decision to sign the agreement.3 The first report will analyse the economic impact of 
this agreement on Western Sahara. Commission representatives have already revealed before 
the INTA (International Trade) Committee of the European Parliament that the report will 
conclude that the agreement will result in considerable benefits for the people of Western 
Sahara, and that not extending the preferential treatment to products originating in this 
territory would have a negative impact on trade and investment in Western Sahara. The second 
report will analyse the involvement of – and support from – the people of Western Sahara for 
this agreement (i.e. the extension of preferential treatment to products originating in Western 
Sahara). Considering the Court’s judgement, in particular its conclusion in relation to the pacta 
tertiis principle, securing the consent of the people of Western Sahara is essential in order to 
comply with the Court’s ruling – and EU and international (treaty) law in general.  
This will be the most challenging aspect of this undertaking as it raises difficult legal and political 
questions about who is actually the legitimate representative of the people of Western Sahara 
for the purpose of giving consent to this agreement. In order to analyse whether the people of 
Western Sahara support this agreement, the EEAS has set up a consultation procedure 
including meetings in Rabat with interlocutors of ‘the people of Western Sahara’. EEAS officials 
have stressed that the list of interlocutors includes not only Front Polisario (which is recognised 
as the representative of the people of Western Sahara by the UN General Assembly), but also 
members of the regional councils from Western Sahara, socio-economic stakeholders, research 
institutes, economic operators, development agencies and civil society organisations focusing 
on human rights. The findings of these meetings will be presented in the report. In order to 
comply with the Court’s judgement, however, the EU will need to be creative in finding a way 
to obtain the express consent of this diverse group to be bound by this agreement.   
It will also be crucial for the Commission and the Council to be as transparent as possible about 
this process, in particular towards the European Parliament, which in the end will need to 
approve this agreement. The European Parliament had earlier in 2011 rejected the extension 
of a previous Protocol to the Fisheries Agreement (see below) because it considered, inter alia, 
that it was unclear whether the agreement benefited the population of the disputed Western 
Sahara region. The Chairman of the INTA Committee, Bernd Lange, complained in February of 
this year about the lack of transparency in the negotiations on the adaptation of the AA 
protocols, stating that the agreement was negotiated “behind closed doors”.4 Moreover, 
several of the Committee’s members expressed concern about the compliance of this 
agreement with the Court’s ruling and even suggested labelling requirements similar to those 
applicable to products originating from the occupied Palestinian territories, or to ask the CJEU 
for an Opinion whether the envisaged agreement is compatible with EU law. 
                                                        
3 EEAS and DG Trade officials discussed this agreement and these two reports during the INTA Committee 
meeting, 19 February 2018 (see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event 
=20180219-1500-COMMITTEE-INTA).  
4 INTA Committee meeting, 19 February 2018, ibid. 
4 | GUILLAUME VAN DER LOO 
 
The Fisheries Agreement (and associated Protocols) 
In line with its reasoning in Council v. Front Polisario, the Court also argued in Western Sahara 
Campaign UK that the (waters adjacent to the) territory of Western Sahara is not included 
within the scope of the Fisheries Agreement or the associated Protocols as this would be 
contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and certain rules of general international 
law applicable between the EU and Morocco, including the principle of self-determination and 
the pacta tertiis principle. In a joint declaration adopted just after the judgement of the CJEU, 
HR Federica Mogherini and the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs Nasser Bourita noted that 
“the spirit of close and sincere consultation that has guided the process of adapting the 
agricultural agreement has created a valuable reservoir of trust for deepening the partnership” 
and they expressed “their willingness to negotiate the necessary instruments in relation to the 
fisheries partnership”. 
It appears that, similar to the AA and the Liberalisation Agreement, the EU also wants to extend 
the territorial application of the Fisheries Agreement to Western Sahara. On March 21st, the 
Commission adopted a recommendation to negotiate an amendment to the Fisheries 
Agreement and to conclude a new Protocol (as the current one will expire in July 2018).5 A 
Commission’s ex-post/ex-ante evaluation study concluded that the renewal of the Protocol 
would be beneficial for both the EU and Morocco, including Western Sahara.6 The document 
states that “the EU position is that it is possible to extend the bilateral agreements with 
Morocco to Western Sahara under certain conditions”. Although the proposal mentions that it 
takes into account the ruling of the Court, the annexed draft negotiating directives mention 
that one of the key objectives of the negotiations will be to provide access “to the waters 
adjacent to the non-self-governing Territory of Western Sahara”. The Commission proposes the 
inclusion of a mechanism to ensure that it is sufficiently informed on the geographical and social 
distribution of the socio-economic benefits under the agreement in order to ensure that the 
agreement is beneficial for “the people concerned”. Most likely, this mechanism has to monitor 
– and guarantee – that the EU’s financial contribution to Morocco (in return for the fishing 
rights) is allocated sufficiently to benefit the people of Western Sahara.7 Moreover, according 
                                                        
5 European Commission, ‘Recommendation for a Council Decision to authorise the Commission to open 
negotiations on behalf of the European Union for the amendment of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement and 
conclusion of a Protocol with the Kingdom of Morocco (COM(2018) 151 final (including the proposed negotiating 
Directives).  
6 Evaluation rétrospective et prospective du Protocole à l'accord de partenariat dans le domaine de la pêche 
durable entre l'Union européenne et le Royaume du Maroc. Final report, September 2017 (F&S, Poseidon and 
Megapesca). 
7 The Parliament’s legal service argued, mainly on the basis of the 2002 Opinion issued by the UN Under-Secretary 
General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel (the Corell Opinion), that Morocco, as a “de facto administering 
power”, is responsible for the economic development of Western Sahara and that the Protocol is compatible 
with international law as long as “a certain amount of the financial contribution [granted by the EU] is allocated 
by Morocco to the benefit of Western Sahara population” (Legal Service of the European Parliament, Legal 
Opinion: Protocol between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing 
opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the fisheries Partnership Agreement in force between 
the two parties, SJ-0665/13,D(2013)50041, 04 November 2013, para. 29). 
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to the proposal, the agreement needs to support the efforts of the UN to find a solution 
providing for the self-determination of the people of Western Saharan and include a human 
rights clause. Significantly, the draft negotiating directives also mention that the Commission 
needs to ensure that, at the time of its proposal for signature and conclusion, “the people 
concerned by the agreement have been adequately involved”. In light of the Court’s judgement 
(in particular in relation to the pacta tertiis principle), the people of Western Sahara need to 
give their consent. This poses again the same challenges and legal questions as the Commission 
is facing with regard to the Liberalisation Agreement: Who is the legitimate representative of 
the people of Western Sahara for the conclusion of this agreement (and is it up to the EU to 
make this determination)? And how can their consent be obtained in a transparent way? The 
Council approved the decision authorising the Commission to launch negotiations on 16 April 
2018,8 and the first round of negotiations are taking place in Rabat from April 18th to the 23rd.  
No easy answers 
The Court has ruled that the different agreements concluded between the EU and Morocco do 
not apply to Western Sahara, as this would be contrary to certain rules of general international 
law and the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Remarkably, however, 
the EU aims to continue to apply these agreements to Western Sahara by modifying their 
territorial scope. The Commission is being pushed in this direction by several member states, 
such as Spain (as the majority of EU fishing vessels in Western Sahara are Spanish) and France 
(which has traditionally maintained strong political ties with Morocco). Moreover, the EU does 
not want to jeopardise its diplomatic relations with Morocco, which is a key strategic partner 
for the EU in combatting terrorism and controlling migration in North Africa. In addition, the 
EU is still hoping to relaunch the negotiations on the EU-Morocco Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area.9  
At the same time, however, the Commission (and the EU in general) needs to comply with 
international law and the Court’s case-law related to Western Sahara and it must support the 
efforts of the UN to find a solution providing for the self-determination of its people. This is 
only possible if ‘the people of Western Sahara’ give their consent to modify the territorial scope 
of these agreements to include Western Sahara, which presents the Commission and EEAS with 
thorny legal and political challenges. It also appears that the ‘Polisario saga’ for the CJEU is not 
yet over. In a statement issued on April 16th, Front Polisario reiterated its opposition to the 
inclusion of Western Sahara in the renegotiation of the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement and 
announced that it will initiate new legal proceedings before the CJEU to challenge this new 
agreement.10  
                                                        
8 3612nd Council meeting, Agriculture and Fisheries, Luxembourg, 16 April 2018. 
9 On the EU-Morocco DCFTA, see G. Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs with 
Tunisia and Morocco”, Euromesco Paper No. 28, European Institute of the Mediterranean, March 2016.  
10 Moreover, another action against the 2013 Fisheries Protocol brought by Front Polisario before the General 
Court is still pending (Case T-180/14, Front Polisario v Council). 
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In essence, the Commission must pursue the EU’s strategic interests and support the economic 
and political situation of the people of Western Sahara, while simultaneously complying with 
the Court’s rulings and international law. In any event, if the Commission and Council want to 
avoid the agreement’s rejection by the European Parliament, they will need to be fully 
transparent on how they proceed in striking this difficult balance.  
